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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sabra Adams was convicted of aggravated assault after a jury trial. On appeal, she
asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial after one juror admitted,
midway through the trial, that he knew the complaining witness’s mother. Ms. Adams asserts
district court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence which was also prohibited 404(b) propensity
evidence. Ms. Adams also asserts that that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when
the prosecutor disparaged the defense and misstated the reasonable doubt standard, thereby
lessening the State’s burden of proof. Finally, Ms. Adams contends that the district court erred
by denying her motion for a new trial.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous contentions regarding the
404(b) evidence admitted during Ms. Adams’ trial, and to correct the State’s erroneous
assumption that a Brady violation cannot be addressed through a motion for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Adams’ Appellant’s Brief, and need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, one of the State’s
characterizations of a fact is at issue and correction is required. The State erroneously classified
Mr. Wes Sherwood as “[Ms.] Adams’ friend.” (Resp. Br., p.6.) However, this was error as
Mr. Sherwood was identified as Ms. Latisha Smith’s friend by Ms. Smith herself. (See Trial
Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.8.)

1

ISSUES1
I.

Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant propensity evidence?

II.

Was Ms. Adams’ constitutional right to a fair trial with an impartial jury violated when
the district court failed to give a curative instruction and denied her motion for mistrial
following a seated juror’s disclosure that he knew the complaining witness’s mother?

III.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by disparaging the defense and by misstating the
State’s burden of proof?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Adams’ motion for a new trial
as the court’s finding that Ms. Adams’ newly discovered evidence was evidence the
defense should have located had it exercised due diligence is not supported by substantial
evidence and misapplies the applicable law?

1

Ms. Adams will address only the State’s arguments as to the 404(b) propensity evidence (Issue
#1) and the Brady claim (Issue #4). The State’s arguments regarding Issues #2, #3 are
unavailing and no additional argument is required.
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Admitting Irrelevant Propensity Evidence
At trial, the jury heard from a State’s witness that Ms. Adams threatened her about giving
her knife back, saying she would slit her throat and said she was going to “burn down the bar.”
(Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.7-10.) This testimony was admitted over defense counsel’s objection that
such conduct is irrelevant to whether Ms. Adams committed aggravated assault against Latisha
Smith, and further, was propensity evidence improperly admitted absent I.R.E. 404(b)
considerations of notice and probative value versus prejudicial effect.
The State’s argument that the statement made by Ms. Adams as she left the bar was
“intrinsic to the crime charged” is simply another way of saying “res gestae” evidence, a doctrine
which was abandoned by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573-74
(2017). (Resp. Br., p.12.) Notably, in support of its “intrinsic to the crime charged” exception,
the State cites to a 2012 Court of Appeals decision for the definition of when evidence of an act
is “intrinsic” with evidence of the crime charged.

(See Resp. Br., p.12 (quoting State v.

Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 2012).) The Whitaker Court explained:
Evidence of an act is intrinsic when it and evidence of the crime charged are
inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part of a single criminal episode, or it
was a necessary preliminary to the crime charged.” State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho
225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683,
689 (5th Cir.2007)). Evidence is inextricably intertwined when it is “so
interconnected with the charged offense that a complete account of the charged
offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the uncharged
misconduct.”
Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949 (internal quotations omitted).

3

This is merely another way of describing the “res gestae” doctrine. See State v. Kralovec,
161 Idaho 569, 573 (2017). In Kralovec, the Idaho reiterated the district court’s explanation of
res gestae and described it as “sound”:
Res gestae evidence is other acts that occur during the commission of or in close
temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to complete
the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings. It is admissible, despite I.R.E. 404(b)’s general
prohibition on prior bad act evidence, if the charged act and the uncharged act are
so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct.
Id. 161 Idaho at 573 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, in Kralovec, the Idaho
Supreme Court “decline[d] to perpetuate the use of the res gestae doctrine in Idaho,” concluding
that “evidence previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the
criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74. Here, the
evidence did not meet the criteria of I.R.E. 404(b) and thus should not have been admitted.
Where the State failed to file timely notice that it intended to introduce 404(b) evidence,
the evidence of Ms. Adams’ prior bad acts is inadmissible. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,
230-31 (2008). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that compliance with the notice requirement
of I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory. Id. As the introduction of this evidence was highly prejudicial to
the defendant, and because such evidence also likely caught defense counsel off-guard when the
district court permitted its introduction, the district court erred in admitting the testimony and
Ms. Adams’ conviction should be vacated. See id.
The State claims that the witness’s testimony that Ms. Adams threatened Ms. Shippy was
not I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but was evidence of the crime for which Ms. Adams was on trial.
(Resp. Br., p.19.) However, a threat made to a bystander as she was exiting the bar was not the
act for which Ms. Adams was charged. It was a separate bad act, a threat made after the incident
for which she was charged. See State v. Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1982)
4

(holding propensity evidence of subsequent bad conduct was not inadmissible merely because
the event testified to occurred subsequent to the crime being prosecuted in the current case but
must be analyzed the same as evidence of prior bad conduct).
Additionally, the State misstates Ms. Adams’ argument on appeal—it claims she is
asserting that the “district court did not provide a sufficient enough record to support the
admission of Ms. Shippy’s testimony” (Resp. Br., p.14); however, that is not the case.
Ms. Adams contends that the district court erred in admitting prohibited I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.
(App. Br., pp.12-15.) Further, the State misapprehends Ms. Adams’ obligation to make a record
supporting her claim on appeal. (Resp. Br., p.15.) The State claims Ms. Adams’ argument fails
“because it was Adams’ burden, both below and on appeal to provide any record of the district
court’s decision or analysis during the sidebar she requested.” (Resp. Br., p.14.) The State cites
to State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996), in support of its proposition that it was
Ms. Adams’ burden “to make a record.” (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) In Beck, the court held “where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions
of the trial court.” Beck, 128 Idaho at 422. However, Beck was a case in which the appellant
asserted that the district court abused its sentencing discretion, but failed to ensure that a copy of
the PSI was in the record on appeal. Id. Here, a sidebar occurred, but it was untranscribed. The
appellant cannot be held responsible for lack of a record on appeal when no record was created.
Cases such as Beck and State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding appellant
failed to provide for the Court’s review “crucial evidence upon which the district court relied”—
a photograph of the porch in which a privacy interest was asserted), hold that “where pertinent
portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court,” not that the appellant can be penalized anytime the district court supplies reasoning or

5

issues a ruling that was not transcribed or recorded for reasons within the district court’s control.
Beck, 128 Idaho at 422. Further, such a standard would undoubtedly run afoul of the defendant’s
due process rights. See State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002) (holding one aspect of a
criminal defendant’s due process and equal protection rights is that the defendant has a right to
“a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding
the proceedings below.”) Where a defendant is guaranteed a statutory right to appellate review
as an integral part of the system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment protects the defendant on appeal. Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1969); Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). In order to
satisfy due process, an appellant must be provided with “a ‘record of sufficient completeness,’ . .
. for adequate consideration of the errors assigned.” Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 49799 (1963) (quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962)).
As any effective appellate advocate will attest, the most basic and fundamental
tool of his profession is the complete trial transcript, through which his trained
fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam in search of an error, a lead to an
error, or even a basis upon which to urge a change in an established and hitherto
accepted principle of law. Anything short of a complete transcript is incompatible
with effective appellate advocacy.
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Thus, as the majority in Hardy recognized, in order for an appellate attorney to identify points of
trial error and determine their merit, the attorney should be able to read “the entire transcript.”
Id. at 279-80. A procedure which deprives an appellant “of a full record, briefs, and arguments”
also deprives the appellant of “‘all hope of any (adequate and effective) appeal at all.’”
Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 752 (1967) (quoting Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485
(1963)).
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The State next claims that Ms. Adams’ assertion that the State did not comply with the
notice requirement of 404(b) was not preserved (Resp. Br., p.14 n. 2); however, it is the State’s
burden to show that evidence of prohibited 404(b) propensity is admissible—the Rule provides
that it is inadmissible, absent notice and when it is admitted for some other purpose. “Under
I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a defendant’s
criminal propensity.”

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).

Such evidence may,

however, be admissible for a non-propensity or non-character purposes so long as the
prosecution provides timely notice of its intent to use such evidence. Id; I.R.E. 404(b). The
reviewing court employs a two-step analysis to determine: (1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the
evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than character or criminal propensity;
and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Id.
Here, the State sought to have the evidence admitted for an improper purpose—to show
Ms. Adams’ propensity to make threats of violence. During closing remarks, the prosecutor told
the jury:
And it’s clear to see how angry she was during the course of this incident and
during the immediate aftermath of the incident. And I ask you to recall the
testimony that not only did she threaten Latisha, she also threatened to kill Nicole
Shippy and others in the bar and to burn down the bar itself. This is a very, very
angry woman. And so the motive is clear as a bell, as they say.
(Trial Tr., p.357, Ls.19-23.). Such evidence is unfairly prejudicial because it tends to suggest
that the jury should base its decision on an improper basis.” See State v. Rawlings, 159 Idaho
498, 506 (2015) (internal citations omitted). The district court erred because Ms. Adams’
conduct after the incident is irrelevant to whether she committed aggravated assault against
Latisha Smith, and further, was propensity evidence improperly admitted absent I.R.E. 404(b)
7

considerations.

Ms. Adams asserts that district court erroneously admitted the irrelevant

testimony without analyzing the prejudicial nature of the testimony, and it failed to address the
State’s I.R.E. 404(b) notice violation.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Ms. Adams’ Motion For A New Trial As
The Court’s Finding That Ms. Adams’ Newly Discovered Evidence Was Evidence The Defense
Should Have Located Had It Exercised Due Diligence Is Not Supported By Substantial Evidence
And Misapplies The Applicable Law
Ms. Adams’ motion for new trial was based upon newly discovered evidence that Wes
Sherwood, an eyewitness to the incident, had spoken to the investigating deputy the night before
trial and told him that Ms. Adams did not have a knife during the altercation. (R., pp.216-217.)
In his sworn statement, Mr. Sherwood affirmed that Deputy Talbot told him not to show up at
court to testify. (R., p.217.) However, in analyzing the new evidence in light of the standards set
forth in Brady, the district court found the State did not suppress the existence of Wes Sherwood
and denied the motion. (R., p.229.)
Although the investigating officer conducted interviews with Mr. Sherwood the night
before trial, the State did not disclose that the interviews occurred, what was discussed—that
Mr. Sherwood was present during the altercation and neither party had a knife, or that the officer
then told the eyewitness not to show up at court to testify at Ms. Adams’ trial. (R., pp.216-17.)
Mr. Sherwood’s testimony was evidence that could have been used to impeach the statements of
the State’s witnesses, or undermine their credibility and cast doubt on the truthfulness of their
testimony. By suppressing this exculpatory evidence, the State violated Ms. Adams’ due process
rights.
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Ms. Adams asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a
new trial. By Ms. Smith’s own account, Mr. Sherwood was right there during the altercation,
holding her arms. (See Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.18-19; p.395, Ls.14-20; p.411, Ls.18-22.) It was
critical for Ms. Adams to have information as to the substance of his testimony where the only
other defense witnesses were friends with the defendant who may not have seen the entire
altercation. (Trial Tr., p.362, L.20 – p.363, L.8 (prosecutor telling the jury that Ms. Moore did
not see the whole incident, that Ms. Moore’s “back was to the defendant at the time that the
incident apparently started.”) Ms. Smith described Mr. Sherwood as a friend of hers; thus, it
would be reasonable for the defense to assume that his testimony would not be exculpatory but
would instead favor his friend, Ms. Smith. 2 (Trial Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.8.) A third witness
for the defense, one like Mr. Sherwood who was friends with the complaining witness and who
was involved in breaking up the scuffle, would likely have very persuasive testimony sufficient
to undermine confidence in the verdict.
The State asserts that Ms. Adams’ Brady claim is unpreserved because, “[t]he district
court, when denying Adams’ motion, cited to Brady for the proposition that the state cannot
suppress material favorable to the defendant.” (Resp. Br., pp.32-39.) The State appears to
believe that, despite the district court’s order analyzing Ms. Adams’ assertions under Brady,
somehow the district court did not conduct a “Brady analysis;” thus, the issue is unpreserved.
(Resp. Br., p.35.) This is untenable, particularly in light of the holding of the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (holding that most issues cannot be raised

2

The only testimony or evidence that Mr. Sherwood was Ms. Adams’ friend was through
Deputy Talbot’s affidavit, and he fails to explain why he believed this to be true; Ms. Adams
refuted this characterization at the hearing on her motion for a new trial. (R., pp.226-27; Trial
Tr., p.397, Ls.20-24.)
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for the first time on appeal; “An exception to this rule, however, has been applied by this Court
when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court.”) The issue was preserved where
Ms. Adams argued that the problem was with the exculpatory or impeaching testimony the State
had learned of before trial that was not disclosed to the defense. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.3-8.) This
is precisely the Brady standard. Which the district court recognized and ruled on. (R., pp.229230.) “This is because [Brady] claims derive from prosecutorial misconduct, whereas Drapeau
claims deal with evidence that was unknown to the defendant not due to prosecutorial
misconduct.” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503 (2017).
As she did in the trial court, on appeal Ms. Adams argued that the district court erred
when it denied her motion for a new trial because the State failed to disclose the fact that Deputy
Talbot interviewed Mr. Sherwood the evening before trial, Mr. Sherwood told the officer he
witnessed the altercation and neither woman had a knife, and the officer then told him his
testimony would not be needed at Ms. Adams’ trial. (App. Br., pp.31-43.) Notably, neither the
prosecution nor the defense referenced State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976), or argued
that the issue must be analyzed under Drapeau factors, which is the State’s assertion on appeal.
(Resp. Br., pp.32-39; see R., pp.209-230; see also Trial Tr., pp.391-412.) In its written motion,
the defense asserted that the State had a duty pursuant to I.C.R. 16(a) to automatically disclose
any evidence in its possession which tends to negate guilt. (R., p.210.) Defense counsel set forth
the factors of I.C. § 19-2406 (R., p.210), at the motion hearing and maintained that the State
suppressed the evidence. (Trial Tr., p.394, Ls.16-25; p.395, L.24 – p.396, L.4; p.410, Ls.3-8.)
Ultimately, a Brady claim is properly raised in a motion for a new trial, and the district court
would have been remiss to ignore the Brady claim in ruling on the motion. See Lankford, 162
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Idaho at 503, 507 (holding defendant was entitled to a new trial where witness’s false testimony
about his motive for testifying “could have affected the judgment of the jury.”)
In Lankford, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Brady and Napue claims are
properly raised through a motion for a new trial, although subject to different standards. Id. 162
Idaho at 502-03. While all Brady and Napue claims are prosecutorial misconduct, not all
prosecutorial misconduct takes the form of a Brady and/or Napue violation. Generally, because
prosecutorial misconduct is not an enumerated statutory ground for a new trial, it is not a
cognizable basis for a motion for a new trial. See I.C. § 19-2406; State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673,
675 (1997) (“Although I.C.R. 34 allows a trial court to grant a new trial ‘if required in the
interest of justice,’ this Court has concluded that I.C.R. 34 does not provide an independent
ground for a new trial. Rather, I.C.R. 34 simply states the standard that the trial court must apply
when it considers the statutory grounds.” (citations omitted)); State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442
(Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he only grounds upon which a new trial may be granted in a criminal case
are those set forth in I.C. § 19-2406, which do not include prosecutorial misconduct.”); I.C.R. 34
(“The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the
interest of justice.”).

Moreover, because most prosecutorial misconduct claims involve a

prosecutor’s conduct at trial, they do not qualify as newly discovered evidence, which is an
enumerated statutory ground for a new trial. See I.C. § 19-2406(7) (“[T]he court may . . . grant a
new trial in the following cases only: . . . (7) When evidence is discovered material to the
defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at
trial.”); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming district court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for new trial premised on prosecutor’s misconduct at trial because
prosecutorial misconduct at trial is not among the recognized grounds for a new trial).
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Brady claims are different; by definition, they involve information discovered after trial
that was unknown to the defense, but known to prosecutors. Such information usually comes to
light when a defendant learns after trial that a prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the
defense. A Brady violation is of constitutional dimension; in addition to being incompatible
“with the rudimentary demands of justice,” Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), it
deprives a defendant of due process and a fair trial by deceiving and depriving the fact-finder of
important evidence relevant to the credibility of witnesses and the determination of guilt, thereby
undermining confidence in the verdict. For these reasons, a defendant’s right to pursue post-trial
relief from prosecutors’ Brady violations through a motion for a new trial has always been
recognized. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (considering and deciding the merits
of the defendant’s Brady claim, brought through a motion for new trial, that the State withheld
exculpatory impeachment evidence); State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 (1999) (considering
and deciding the merits of the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the State’s failure to
disclose criminal activities of informant who was a principal witness against the defendant at
trial); State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 421 (Ct. App. 2013) (considering merits of defendant’s
motion for a new trial based on prosecutor’s suppression of valuable impeachment evidence in
violation of Brady); State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372 (Ct. App. 1997) (“In those instances
where exculpatory evidence is discovered after trial, the appropriate mechanism to challenge the
nondisclosure of the evidence would be a motion for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406 and I.C.R.
34 or an action for post-conviction relief under I.C. § 19-4901.”).
Thus, the Lankford Court reiterated of the long-standing recognition that convictions
obtained by prosecutors’ presentation of false or perjured testimony, or by prosecutors’
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concealment or withholding of material evidence, are subject to attack through a motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Lankford, 162 Idaho at 502-03.
In this case, the State correctly pointed out that a Brady violation is not subject to the
same standard as other newly discovered evidence. (Resp. Br., p.34.) Brady claims impose a
lower burden on defendants seeking a new trial than would normally apply to a motion for a new
trial premised on other newly discovered evidence. For example, in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho
685, 691 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a four-part test for evaluating motions for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Under this test, a defendant must show: (1) the
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to him at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is
material and not simply cumulative or impeaching; (3) the evidence will probably produce an
acquittal; and (4) the defendant’s failure to learn of the evidence was not due to his lack of
diligence. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691 (citing with approval 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND

PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 557, at 515 (1969)).3 This four-part test imposes a high and

exacting burden on a defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Id.
Such motions are not favored by courts and are viewed with a fair amount of skepticism because
“after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to
given him a second trial.” Id.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho
Court of Appeals have refused to apply this four-part test to motions for a new trial based on a
prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence, which it has explicitly defined to include

3

In adopting this standard, the Drapeau Court observed that Idaho’s new trial rule was taken,
almost verbatim, from the federal new trial rule. 97 Idaho at 691. Concomitantly, the four-part
test adopted by the Drapeau Court was and is the same test used by federal courts to evaluate
new trial claims based on newly discovered evidence. Id.
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impeachment evidence. 4 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976); Avelar, 132 Idaho
at 781; State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 421 (Ct. App. 2013). In Agurs, the United States
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the applicability of the usual new trial standards to motions
premised on Brady and Napue violations.
On the one hand, the fact that such evidence was available to the prosecutor and
not submitted to the defense places it in a different category than if it had simply
been discovered from a neutral source after trial. For that reason the defendant
should not have to satisfy the severe burden of demonstrating that newly
discovered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal. If the standard
applied to the usual motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
were the same when the evidence was in the State’s possession as when it was
found in a neutral source, there would be no special significance to the
prosecutor’s obligation to serve the cause of justice.
427 U.S. at 111 (footnote omitted). As a result, the standards for reviewing whether a Brady
violation warrants a new trial are the same, regardless of whether the claim is raised through a
motion for new trial, or a petition for post-conviction relief. Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002,
1006 (2016) (applying Brady standard to review of petitioner’s state post-conviction claim that
the State withheld exculpatory evidence, including evidence that would have supported his alibi
and would have impeached important state witnesses, and reversing the state court’s denial of
post-conviction relief because the new evidence was sufficient to undermine confidence in the
verdict); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12 (applying Brady standard to review of defendant’s motion

4

The four-part test “applies however, only to ordinary motions on the ground of newly
discovered evidence . . . . [A] less restrictive rule applies if the motion is based on a claim of
false testimony at the trial, and in cases where the prosecutor fails to disclose or suppresses
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady.” 3 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 584 (4th ed.).
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for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that the government withheld evidence of
victim’s prior violent criminal history); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972)
(applying Napue standard to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence that government promised not to prosecute defendant’s co-conspirator if he testified
against the defendant, where that promise was not disclosed to the defendant and prosecutor
allowed the co-conspirator’s false trial testimony that he could still be prosecuted and was
offered nothing in exchange for testimony, to go uncorrected); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho
355, 380-81 (2010) (applying Brady standard to review petitioner’s post-conviction claim that
the State withheld exculpatory evidence from him at trial); Avelar, 132 Idaho at 781 (applying
Brady to review defendant’s motion for a new trial claim that the State suppressed impeachment
evidence about its principal witness against him at trial); Branigh, 155 Idaho at 421 (applying
Brady and explicitly rejecting Drapeau as the proper standard for reviewing defendant’s motion
for a new trial based on State’s suppression of impeachment evidence about its principal witness
against defendant at trial); see also cf. State v. Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, 485 n.4 (2014)
(recognizing there are exceptions to the general applicability of the Drapeau standard to motions
for a new trial premised on newly discovered evidence).
Brady violations involve conduct by the State that deprives a defendant of his right to a
fair trial. Brady stands for the proposition that a State violates a defendant’s due process rights
when it suppresses evidence favorable to a defendant, where such evidence is material either to a
defendant’s guilt or punishment. Id. at 87. There are three components to a Brady violation: (1)
the evidence must be favorable to the accused, which includes impeachment evidence relating to
state witnesses; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either intentionally or
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inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82
(1999).
Favorable evidence includes evidence tending to exculpate the accused, evidence tending
to reduce punishment, and any other evidence that adversely affects the credibility of the
government’s witnesses. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio, 405 U.S. at
154. Withheld evidence can be “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching.” Turner v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893
(2017) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). Evidence is material “if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995); Bagley, 473
U.S. at 682. It is important to remember a “reasonable probability” requires a showing only that
the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome, not that the outcome would have
been different. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-35; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly shown
when the government's evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.”
The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a
sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that after
discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there
would not have been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a
criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One
does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory
evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016), the United States Supreme Court recently
weighed in on the importance and impact of Brady violations. The Court, in a 6-2 per curiam
decision, reiterated that “[t]o prevail on his Brady claim, [the petitioner] need not show that he
‘more likely than not’ would have been acquitted had the new evidence been admitted. He must
show only that the new evidence is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict.” Id. at
1006 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Ms. Adams’ counsel raised the issue of the State withholding exculpatory evidence by
filing a motion for a new trial, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406. (R., pp.209-213.) Defense counsel
asserted that the prosecutor failed to disclose the investigating officer’s interview of
Mr. Sherwood the night before trial, despite the prosecution’s ongoing duty to disclose any
evidence in the prosecutor’s possession which tends to negate the guilt, pursuant to I.C.R. 16(a).
(R., pp.209-210.) Counsel asserted that the witness was interviewed by an investigating officer
the day before trial, told the officer exculpatory information, and was then told his testimony
would not be needed at trial. (R., pp.209-213.) The district court appropriately analyzed the
information under the Brady standard, but ultimately denied the motion, concluding that
Ms. Adams did not meet prong two of Brady where “the Defendant was made aware of the
existence of the additional witness, his existence was not suppressed.” (R., p.229.) However,
this was error. The real question before the district court was not whether the existence of the
witness was suppressed (R., p.229), but whether the State failed to disclose the interview, the
facts learned from Mr. Sherwood—that Deputy Talbot interviewed Mr. Sherwood on the eve of
trial and Mr. Sherwood told him that he witnessed the encounter and Ms. Adams did not have a
knife.

Further, the court should have considered whether the State further suppressed the

information it had gleaned from Mr. Sherwood by telling him that his testimony at trial would
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not be needed and recalling his subpoena. The record lends additional support for Ms. Adams’
contentions. Although Archie Wes Sherwood5 was not identified as a State’s witness for trial in
its December 20, 2016 disclosure, the prosecution prepared a subpoena for Mr. Sherwood on
January 4, 2017. (R., pp.113-14, 179.) However, the subpoena was not served, as shown by the
subsequently filed Recalled Return of Service in which the comments explain: “NOT NEEDED
FOR TRIAL.” (R., pp.179-80.) Service was recalled the day of trial, on January 5, 2017.
(R., p.180; See generally, Trial Tr.) The record supports the assertions made in Ms. Adams’
motion for a new trial due to a Brady violation where a subpoena was issued to Mr. Sherwood
the day before trial, but, after Deputy Talbot spoke to Mr. Sherwood and learned that he would
testify that neither Ms. Adams nor Ms. Smith had a knife, Deputy Talbot told Mr. Sherwood he
would not need to testify at Ms. Adams’ trial, and the next day the subpoena was recalled
because he was “not needed for trial.” Ms. Adams has shown that the evidence was material, it
was favorable to her case, it was suppressed by the State, and “that the new evidence is sufficient
to ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict.” Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016)
(internal citations and quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).

5

Apparently Mr. Sherwood was commonly known by his middle name. It is only in the
Subpoena that he is identified by what is presumably his legal name of “Archie Wes Sherwood.”
(R., p.179.)
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Adams respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and remand her
case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2018.
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